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RESUMEN: Este artículo trata de los esfuerzos de los Habsburgo 
para eliminar la amenaza naval otomana a través de medios clandestinos y 
emprendiendo operaciones secretas. Dándose cuenta del peligro que creaban 
la flota otomana y los corsarios otomanos en sus defensas, los servicios 
secretos de los Habsburgo enviaron a unos mediadores para recordar a 
Uluc Ali su pasado cristiano y sus obligaciones hacia su verdadero monarca 
y convencerle de que hiciera alianzas. los Habsburgo también intentaron 
organizar el magnicidio de este corsario que llegó al cénit de su poder como 
el Gran Almirante otomano. Mientras la eficacia de los servicios secretos 
de los Habsburgo nos demuestra el poder de los mecanismos y las redes 
epistolares a la hora de recabar información en el circunmediterráneo, los 
intentos de magnicidio y de deserción nos sirven para analizar un aspecto 
poco estudiado de las rivalidades inter-imperiales: la diplomacia secreta.
Palabras clave: Magnicidio; desertor; soborno; conspiración; diplomacia 
secreta; espionaje; diplomacia interconfesional; corsarios otomanos; rivalidad 
otomano-habsburgica. 
ABSTRACT: This article deals with Habsburg efforts to eliminate the 
ottoman naval threat by employing clandestine measures and undertaking 
covert operations. Realizing the danger that the ottoman fleet and cors-
airs created for their defenses, the Habsburg secret service dispatched 
a number of go-betweens in order to remind Uluc Ali of his Christian 
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past and obligations to his true monarch and thus convince him to switch 
allegiances. The Habsburgs also tried to arrange the assassination of this 
dangerous corsair who reached the zenith of his power as the ottoman 
Grand Admiral. While the efficiency of Habsburg secret service demonstrate 
us the strength of circum-Mediterranean information gathering mechanisms 
and epistolary networks, the attempts of assassination and defection point 
to an understudied aspect of inter-imperial rivalries: secret diplomacy. 
Key words: Assassination; Defection; Bribery; Conspiracy; Secret 
Diplomacy; Espionage; Cross-Confessional Diplomacy; ottoman Corsairs; 
ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry.
1. Introduction
The sixteenth century witnessed the concomitant rise of two powers, the 
ottomans in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Habsburgs in the West. The 
rivalry between these two empires became the major driving force in international 
politics. The result was a «global» conflict where every polity in Europe and the 
Mediterranean had to take their sides, some as allies, some as vassals1. 
There were two main theatres of competition: the Hungarian plains and the 
Mediterranean waters. Even though from the ottoman point of view military expe-
ditions undertaken in Hungary were far more important than naval operations in 
the Mediterranean2, the latter were more threatening to the Habsburgs, especially 
following the break-up of Charles v’s empire in 1556. The conflict in the Medite-
rranean manifested itself in a number of ways. First of all, there were major naval 
battles between large imperial fleets in 1538, 1560 and 1571. However, as Francis 
Guilmartin has aptly noted, such battles could not produce strategic results in the 
Mediterranean3. The nature of galley warfare rendered it essential to acquire naval 
bases in order to support the operations of large fleets. Hence, a second type of 
 1. Those who wanted to remain neutral such as venice and Ragusa struggled. They managed 
to stay clear of this rivalry only thanks to their centuries-long commercial and diplomatic networks 
on both sides of the conflict. In spite of its political relevance, the ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry is an 
understudied subject. There are a good number of articles written recently in a variety of languages, 
but a proper and comprehensive monograph is still lacking. Nonetheless, Özlem Kumrular’s two 
books are worthy of mention: KUMRUlAR, Ö.: Las relaciónes entre el Imperio Otomano y la Monar-
quía Católica entre los años 1520-1535 y el papel de los estados satélites. Estambul, 2003. KUMRUlAR, 
Ö.: El duelo entre Carlos V y Solimán el Magnífico (1520-1535). Estambul, 2005. 
 2. It is indicative that while they spared tens of pages to the ottoman-Habsburg conflict 
in Hungary, contemporary ottoman histories mostly omitted even the most important wars and 
political events in the Mediterranean.
 3. GUIlMARTIN, J. F.: Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean 
Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century. london, 1974, p. 3.
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conflict was besieging naval strongholds such as Malta, la Goletta and Algiers. A 
third way of settling scores was to resort to the service of corsairs, i.e. privateers 
funded by central authorities. Here, the ottomans had the upper hand. When they 
found themselves engaged in an imperial rivalry with the Habsburgs in the 1520s, 
already there were established corsair centers in North Africa. These corsairs were 
attacking Habsburg coasts and challenging lines of communication, trade and supply 
at the very heart of their empire. They quickly entered into a mutually beneficial 
alliance with Istanbul against the common enemy, the Habsburgs4.
In the Mediterranean, the Habsburgs usually remained on the defensive. 
While the ottoman fleet dispatched from Istanbul reached its full potential by 
roaming the waters of the Tyrrhenian, ligurian and the Balearic Sea in 1543, 1544, 
1550, 1552, 1553, 1555 and 1558, ottoman corsairs located in North African 
ports ravaged Habsburg coasts in Sicily, Naples, Sardinia, Aragon, valencia and 
Granada. Moreover, the latter challenged the Habsburg power in North Africa as 
well. They laid siege to Habsburg presidios in the region and attacked their allies 
such as Tlemcen, Morocco and Tunis.
Even though they had extensive dominions in Mare Nostrum, the Mediterranean 
front was not the first priority for Habsburg decision-makers. As their fragmented 
possessions throughout Europe bestowed upon them several responsibilities, they 
had more pressing concerns. Until 1559, they were engaged in a perennial war with 
their nemesis, France and they had to participate in Italian wars. Similarly, the issue 
of Protestantism evolved in time into an open challenge to the Habsburg authority 
both in the Holy Roman Empire where the Emperor Charles v had to concede the 
treaty of Augsburg (1555) and in the low Countries where a rebellion that would 
end in independence eight decades later erupted in 1568. Alongside these concerns 
came the powerful ottoman challenge in Central Europe and the Balkans which 
culminated in the siege of vienna in 1529 and the expedition of 1532. 
Moreover, even though the Habsburgs went to great lengths in order to meet the 
ottoman challenge in the Mediterranean, most of the costly naval operations they 
undertook produced little strategic result. The ottomans could not be stopped in 
spite of the decisive Christian victory at the Battle of lepanto (1571). Next year, a 
quickly rebuilt ottoman fleet would successfully bar Don Juan’s eastward progress 
«by taking refuge under the cliffs and batteries of Modon»5 and ward off the Chris-
tian threat in the Eastern Mediterranean. Soon, it would take the offensive and carry 
 4. For the evolution and dynamics of this alliance, see. GÜRKAN, E. S.: «The Centre and the 
Frontier: ottoman Cooperation with the North African Corsairs in the Sixteenth Century», Turkish 
Historical Review, 1/2, 2010, pp. 125-163.
 5. GUIlMARTIN, J. F.: Gunpowder and Galleys, p. 250. For a detailed analysis of Uluc Ali’s 
evasive campaign in 1572, see. BRAUDEl, F.: La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque 
de Philippe II. Paris, 1966, 2nd ed, vol. II, pp. 409-415.
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the war to the western half of the Mare Nostrum: it re-reconquered Tunis and la 
Goletta in 1574 and anchored in Algiers for an aborted Moroccan expedition in 1581. 
Moreover, in spite of repeated naval operations and sieges, it proved impossible to 
dislodge corsairs from their North African bases. on the contrary, they intensified 
their depredations in Habsburg waters and consolidated their power in the North 
African hinterland. The age of the «little wars» in the Mediterranean had just begun.
This thorn in the Habsburg side not only cost huge amounts of money for an 
empire whose financial difficulties are best epitomized by its frequent bankruptcies 
in 1557, 1560, 1575, and 1596. It also forced the Habsburgs to reorganize their 
defenses and always remain alert6; thus, it reduced their strategic flexibility and 
impaired their war efforts elsewhere. For instance, Geoffrey Parker established a 
correlation between the ottoman challenge in the Mediterranean and the Habs-
burg military vigor against Calvinist rebels in the low Countries7. Therefore, 
it should come as no surprise that the Habsburgs reached the conclusion that 
methods other than open military conflict should be employed in order to pacify 
the ottoman threat that caused them so much trouble.
This essay will concentrate on one of these methods: the Habsburg secret 
service’s efforts to eliminate the threat imposed by the famous ottoman corsair 
Uluc Ali, a key player in ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the Mediterranean for 
more than two decades as the governor-general of Tripolis (o. 1565-1568) and of 
Algeria (o. 1568-1572) and the ottoman Grand Admiral (o. 1572-1587). It will 
delineate how Habsburg agents negotiated Uluc Ali’s defection to the Habsburg 
camp on the one hand and plotted against his life on the other. 
2. Uluc Ali as a Habsburg target: Assassination and Defection in 
Sixteenth-century Mediterranean
Born in a small village of Calabria and enslaved by ottoman corsairs when he 
was a young boy, Uluc Ali’s exceptional success on the Mediterranean frontier is 
a story told too many times8 and needs not concern us here. What is interesting 
 6. For these preparations, see. BoNo, S.: I corsari barbareschi. Torino, 1964, pp. 193-216.
 7. According to him, it was the siege of Malta that prevented Philip II’s travel to the low 
Countries. Such a visit only a year before the Dutch Revolt commenced could be of key importance 
in dispelling the anti-Habsburg spirit. Moreover, according to a Frenchmen in Brussels in 1574, the 
loss of la Goletta would push Philip II to come to terms with the rebels. PARKER, G.: Dutch Revolt. 
Ithaca, 1977, p. 166, fn. 49. When on August 31, 1577 Philip II received Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s 
assurance that the ottoman fleet would not attack the Habsburg coasts, he immediately dispatched 
veteran soldiers from Italy to the low Countries. PARKER, G.: Dutch Revolt, p. 188, fn 18.
 8. There are a number of works on Uluc Ali’s life. Two stand out:  vAlENTE, G.: Vita di Occhialì. 
Milano, 1960; SolA, E.: Uchalí: El Calabrés Tiñoso, o el mito del corsario muladí en la frontera. 
Barcelona, 2011. 
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from our point of view is how his trans-imperial connections on both sides of 
the conflict brought forth the possibility of cross-confessional diplomacy. The 
following will not only shed light on the clandestine measures employed (or 
covert operations undertaken) in the ottoman-Habsburg rivalry. By focusing 
on the information gathering mechanisms and circum-Mediterranean epistolary 
networks, it will also illuminate the conduits through which secret diplomacy was 
conducted across the seemingly impermeable civilizational boundaries between 
the Christian and the Muslim Mediterranean.
As soon as he started to rise through the ranks of the corsair establishment 
in North Africa, Uluc Ali entered into the orbit of the Habsburg secret service. 
The Habsburgs’ military power was at best fragile in the Western Mediterra-
nean following the annihilation of their fleet by the ottomans at Djerba (1560). 
luckily for them, the ottomans chose not to reap the benefits of this exceptional 
victory and their fleet stayed in the Eastern Mediterranean rather than sailing 
into the Habsburg waters9. When it did return in 1565 in order to besiege Malta 
–a Christian corsair den as well as a strategic port–, the outnumbered Habsburg 
fleet nearby could only apply the strategy of wait and see. only at the right 
moment when months of heavy fighting wore down the ottoman fleet and the 
besieging army, the Habsburg admiral Don García de Toledo acted and forced 
the ottomans to break the siege10. Nor were Habsburg galleys doing any better 
against ottoman corsairs who not only continued their attacks on Habsburg 
coasts but also undertook military expeditions against presidios in North Africa 
such as Mers el-Kébir.
Where guns failed, diplomacy and espionage could be effective tools. By means 
of their agents throughout the Mediterranean, the Habsburg authorities sought to 
eliminate the ottoman naval threat. First, they tried to bribe prominent ottoman 
corsairs such as Uluc Ali and tried to ensure their defection to the Habsburg side. 
When this failed they tried to assassinate them. 
Changing sides was a common feature of sixteenth century politics and there 
was nothing unrealistic about the defection of an ottoman corsair. For instance, 
the famous Genoese admiral/condottiere Andrea Doria switched allegiance 
from the French to the Habsburg side in 1527 at the most crucial moment of 
Italian wars11. Similarly, another important Habsburg military figure, Charles de 
 9. To see how much the Habsburg authorities feared an ottoman naval offensive following 
the Battle of Djerba, BRAUDEl, F.: La Méditerranée, pp. 297-301.
 10. GUIlMARTIN, J. F.: Gunpowder and Galleys, pp. 191-2.
 11. Upset with Francis’ plans to develop Genoa’s rival Savona as a commercial port, Andrea 
could not resist the favorable terms proposed by the imperialists. His defection with his fleet at a 
time when French soldiers were besieging Naples tipped the fragile balance of power in favor of the 
Habsburgs.
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Bourbon was a turncoat; when he quarreled with his suzerain Francis I over an 
inheritance issue, he sought refuge in Habsburg service12. Even though religious, 
cultural and legal differences between Christian Europe and Muslim ottoman 
Empire may lead one to assume that cross-cultural defections were unlikely, 
this was hardly the case, especially when it came to men with military skills. As 
they were high in demand, they traveled freely and found employment across 
civilizational boundaries. They were not even required to convert, at least not 
in the case of the ottomans. However, the unsuccessful career of Christophe 
Roggendorf13 as well as the disappearance of Christian timar holders in the 
Balkans testify to the fact that the ottomans became less inclined to elevate 
Christians to influential positions in the sixteenth century, which would be the 
century of confessionalization not only in Europe, but also, as recent studies 
suggest14, in the East.
In fact, a number of high-level ottoman renegades came into the orbit of 
Habsburg secret service. Corsairs were natural targets. First, their position rendered 
them important in the Habsburgs’ eyes. Second, most of them were of Western 
Mediterranean origin with cultural and familial ties in Christian Europe. Recent 
studies demonstrate that changing religion did not mean that the converts severed 
ties with their past. They kept their memories and familial ties intact15, without 
 12. Quite ironically, he was one of the Habsburg generals in the Battle of Pavia where Francis I 
prisoner to the Habsburgs.
 13. Roggendorf was a hereditary grand master of Austria, one of Ferdinand of Austria’s 
chief counselors and his lord high steward. When Charles v ruled against him in a dispute over 
property with his wife, the wronged Roggendorf left the Habsburg camp and sought employment 
in Istanbul, the capital of the ottomans against whom he had previously defended Buda and 
vienna in the 1520s. The ottomans appointed him a müteferrika in the palace, a position which 
had an income, but no authority. Naturally, he was disillusioned with this symbolic appointment, 
believing he had not received the advancement he deserved. The ottomans informed him that 
should he convert, he would be given the governor-generalship of the Baghdad province. 
According to the French ambassador, they argued that the Sultan was willing to bestow upon 
him more important offices, but as long as he remained a Christian, he could not fully trust 
him and appoint him to a prominent position. In the end, the recalcitrant Roggendorf refused 
to convert and chose to seek his fortunes in France. ISoM-vERHAAREN, C.: «Shifting Identities: 
Foreign State Servants in France and the ottoman Empire», Journal of Early Modern History, 
8/1-2, 2004, pp. 130-1.
 14. KRSTIĆ, T.: «Illuminated by the light of Islam and the Glory of the ottoman Sultanate: 
Self-Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalization», Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 51/1, 2009, pp. 35-63. KRSTIĆ, T.: Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives 
of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire. Stanford, 2011.
 15. BRooS, D. A.: «The Anthropology of Conversion: An Introduction», The Anthropology of 
Religious Conversion, eds. Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier, lanham, 2003, pp. 1-12. DURS-
TElER, E.: Renegade Women: Gender, Identity, and Boundaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean. 
Baltimore, 2011, passim. Sola, E.: Uchalì, passim.
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forgetting their language16, and completely foregoing their faith17. They also 
continued communicating with their kins in the Christian world18. Such cross-
confessional connections could easily be exploited by central governments and 
their negotiators. Moreover, Muslim-born corsairs would not feel an irreconcilable 
hostility towards the Christian «other», either; after all they were accustomed to 
living in cosmopolitan North African port cities.
Certain descriptions in Antonio Sosa’s Topography of Algiers clearly solidify 
our argument19. Moreover, the language in Seyyid Murad’s Gazavat-ı Hayreddin 
Paşa is a good testament to this cosmopolitanism20. Moreover, in spite of modern 
historians’ propensity (especially in Turkey) to depict these entrepreneurial privateers 
 16. For instance, Uluc Ali could still speak Italian, albeit imperfectly, decades after his capture 
in 1583. SolA, E.: Uchalí, pp. 68, 366. 
 17. Several renegades contacted Christian sovereigns and indicated their desire to return to 
Christianity. Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS) is full with documents testifying to their 
genuine interest.
 18. It was a common incident that renegade ottoman grandees brought their kins to their side. 
ottoman Grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha had both his parents convert to Islam, arranged the governor-
ship of a sandjak near Parga for his father and ensured the induction of his two brothers to the Palace 
School (Enderûn). AlBÈRI, E. (ed.): Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo 
decimosesto. Firenze, 1855, Serie III, vol. III, pp. 97 and 103. In a similar fashion, the Grand Admiral 
Hasan «veneziano» was in contact with his family members in venice. His brother-in-law came to 
Constantinople to ask for his reference for the Signoria. Moreover, Hasan employed his cousin livio 
Celeste as a spy. FABRIS, A.: «Hasan ‘il veneziano’ tra Algeria e Costantinopoli», Quaderni di Studi 
Arabi, 5, 1997, pp. 59-61. The ottoman Grand Admiral Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha brought his 
brother Carlo Cicala and secured for him the governorship of the «Aegean Archipelago» (Naxos), 
AGS, Papeles de Estado (hereafter Estado) 1344 K 1675, fol. 44 (30 April 1591); Archivio di Stato 
di venezia (hereafter ASv), Inquisitori di Stato, b. 460, document dated 25 July 1600. Sometimes, it 
was the renegade pashas who visited their relatives. Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha’s quite exceptional 
story is worth noting. After ravaging Sicilian and Neapolitan coasts with a large ottoman navy, he 
anchored off Messina and demanded to see his mother and siblings. Quite interestingly, his wish 
was granted (an ottoman fleet off the coast could be a quite persuasive argument) and next was the 
most unusual family reunion aboard ottoman galleys. AGS, Estado, leg. 1158, fols. 186 (1 october 
1598), 187 (fifteen letters between the Grand Admiral, his family and Habsburg authorities dated 
September 1598).
 19. For instance, according to his account, people from fifty-two nations ranging from Muscovites 
to Danish, from Abyssinians to Indians resided in the city of Algiers. He stated with awe: «there is 
no Christian nation on earth that has not produced renegades in this city». HAEDo, D.: Topografía e 
Historia General de Argel, Madrid, 1927, vol. I, pp. 52-3. For an English version of the first volume 
with a bit controversial title, see. GARCÉS, M. A.: An Early Modern Dialogue with Islam: Antonio 
de Sosa’s Topography of Algiers, trans. Diana de Armas Wilson. Notre Dame, 2011.
 20. Written as a propaganda piece that celebrated the deeds of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha, 
this ottoman text contains too many foreign words that derive from a variety of Mediterranean 
languages. This is quite a novelty. ottoman is flooded with non-Turkish words, but these generally 
come from Arabic and Persian. For the list of these foreign words of western origin, see. GÜRKAN, 
E. S.: «Batı Akdeniz’de osmanlı korsanlığı ve gaza meselesi», Kebikeç: İnsan Bilimleri İçin Kaynak 
Araştırmaları Dergisi, 33, 2012, pp. 180-181.
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as ghazis21, i.e. holy warriors, sixteenth-century corso was an economic enter-
prise undertaken by a number of investors22. Therefore, in this cosmopolitan 
world inhabited by self-interested entrepreneurs, secret negotiations between 
the Habsburg authorities and ottoman corsairs should be considered natural. 
We know that Habsburg spies entered into a series of negotiations with 
another renowned corsair, Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha (born as a Muslim) in late 
1530s and early 1540s23. other governor-generals of Algeria such as Hasan Ağa 
(a Sardinian renegade, o. 1535 - 1544)24, and Mehmed Pasha (o. 1567 - 1568, the 
son of famous Salih Reis, also governor-general of Algeria between 1552 - 1557)25, 
as well as grand admirals such as Hasan veneziano (a venetian renegade, also 
governor-general of Algeria and Tunis)26, and Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha 
(a Genoese renegade)27 secretly negotiated with Habsburg authorities, too. 
In spite of the fact that none of these secret negotiations produced concrete 
results, it is still of cardinal importance that central governments invested time 
and money in them. 
Now let us proceed to the negotiations that took place between Uluc Ali and 
the Habsburg authorities. Could this shrewd Calabrian, a successful entrepreneur 
and a self-made frontier creature, be convinced to return to the bosom of the 
Catholic Church and more importantly to come under the wing of his «natural 
king» (Re Naturale)? Uluc Ali first entered the Habsburg secret service’s radar in 
1567 when he was only the governor-general of Tripolis, a corsair center of lesser 
importance than Algiers. Uluc Ali’s lieutenant, a renegade from lucca named 
Murad Ağa, plotted with Alferez Francisco de orejon and Matheo Pozo. Murad 
offered to kill Uluc Ali and then submit Tripolis to the Habsburgs. Given that the 
 21. For a critique of this propensity, see GÜRKAN, E. S.: «Batı Akdeniz’de osmanlı korsanlığı».
 22. For the economic aspect of corso, see. Bono, S.: Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e 
musulmani fra guerra, schiavitù e commercio. Milano, 1993, pp. 173-211. 
 23. AGS, Estado 1027, fol. 13; E 1031 fols. 26, 58, 98 and 99; Estado 1033, fol. 160; Estado 1372, 
fols. 57, 60, 64, 66, 73 and 84, (1539); Estado 1373 fols. 15, 18, 19, 20, 28, 30, 41, 42, 85, 88, 117, 118, 
119, 151, 156, 160, 165, 176, 178, 181, 187 and 226 (1540); Estado 1376, fol. 34 (1543-4). See also 
Estado 1027, E 1031, E 1033, passim. For a good summary of the negotiations between Charles v 
and Hayreddin, see CAPASSo, C.: «Barbarossa e Carlo v», Rivista Storica Italiana, 49, 1932, pp. 
169-209.
 24. AGS, Estado, leg. 1374, fol. 171, (1541). Also see. Berbrugger, A.: «Négociations entre 
Hassan Agha et le comte d’ Alcaudete, gouverneur d’oran, 1541-1542», Revue Africaine, IX, 1865, 
pp. 379-385.
 25. AGS, Estado, leg. 488, document dated 21 June 1576.
 26. AGS, Estado 1417, fol. 41, 62 and 109 (1583). ASv, Senato Dispacci Costantinopoli (hereafter 
SDC), fil. 30, no. 38 (20 January 1590) quoted by FABRIS, A.: «Hasan ‘il veneziano’», p. 52, fn.5.
 27. AGS, Estado, leg. 1157, fols. 151 (26 February 1593) and 152; Estado 1344 K 1675, fols. 4 
(13 September 1590), 8 (8 December 1590), 44 (30 April 1591), 70 (3 July 1591), 125 (16 February 
1592) and 150 (12 December 1592); Estado 1885, fol. 6 (June 1592). 
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ottomans only recently conquered the city in 1551 from the Maltese knights28, 
the ottoman power was not yet consolidated in the region. The ottomans’ failure 
to capitalize on their victory at Djerba as well as the unsuccessful siege of Malta 
suggest that such a change of hand would not be so hard to realize. Here are the 
details of the plan: orejon and Pozo would come to Tripolis with 20-25 men and 
Murat would secretly allow them in the citadel. According to the latter, with the 
help of local Christians so few men would suffice to defend the citadel until the 
Maltese galleys came to their rescue. Uluc had already left the city with the bulk of 
his forces to fight the Berber tribes in Fezzan, leaving only 50 old guards behind29. 
There is no further documentation on the subject, so we do not know whether 
the plot failed or whether it was not executed at all. We do know, nonetheless, 
that Tripolis remained in ottoman hands until the twentieth-century. The fact 
that Murat Ağa appears in Habsburg documentation eight years later suggests 
that the latter assumption, that the plot was never executed, is more likely.
As could be seen above, even though this plan targeted Uluc Ali’s household 
and power base, the Calabrian corsair was not a direct party to negotiations; he 
was in fact their victim. The first contact between Uluc Ali and Madrid occurred 
in 1569. Encouraged by the news that Uluc was on good terms with Christians, 
the Habsburgs sought to capitalize on his family background. They believed he 
could be persuaded to convert to Christianity and submit Algiers, if negotia-
tions were carefully undertaken, or to use a contemporary expression, if he was 
approached with buena negoçiaçion y industria. An order was sent to the viceroy 
of Naples that he should find one of Uluc Ali’s relatives in Calabria (his mother, 
brothers and some other relatives were still living there) and then send him to 
negotiate with the corsair30. The viceroy failed to locate a reliable relative (they 
were either too young to know the corsair or too old to travel long distances), 
but instead found Giovanni Battista Ganzuga who was not only from Uluc Ali’s 
village, but also his former slave31. According to the plan, Ganzuga was supposed 
to go to Algiers in disguise of a Mercederian friar32. There he would propose his 
former master the following terms: should he accept to switch allegiance and 
submit Algiers to the Habsburgs, he was to be inducted into nobility with the 
title of marquis or count (whichever he would choose) and a fief worth 12.000 
 28. Please note that the knights were Habsburg allies and it was Charles v who gave them Tripolis 
and Malta in 1530 with the obligation that they patrolled the waters of the central Mediterranean 
and protected Habsburg coasts from ottoman attacks.
 29. AGS, Estado, leg. 1132, fols. 22, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33 and 34.
 30. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, document dated 15 December 1568. 
 31. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, document dated 18 March 1569.
 32. Mercederians were a monastic order specialized in slave ransoming in North Africa. The 
document uses the word redentores. The official name of the order was, however, the order of the 
Blessed virgin Mary of Mercy, or Ordo Beatae Mariae de Mercede redemptionis captivorum. 
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ducats per annum. In case Uluc agreed to go on with negotiations, Ganzuga was 
to immediately go to Madrid and discuss the details with Antonio Pérez, Philip 
II’s controversial secretary and the de-facto head of the Habsburg secret service, 
its «real éminence-grise»33. An interesting detail is how this miserable peasant 
would introduce himself to the King’s secretary and convince him that he was in 
fact an Habsburg agent: he would touch the secretary’s hand with his right hand 
in a special manner34.
A second parallel connection was to be established by the Corsican Gasparo 
Corso family35. This was a trans-imperial family composed of five brothers 
who established key trade connections and information networks throughout 
the Western Mediterranean36. one of these, Francisco, a merchant in valencia, 
wanted to make use of his brother Andrea’s (a merchant and a ransom agent) 
connections in Algiers which included several important political and military 
figures. According to the deal that the brothers cut with the viceroy of Aragon, 
the Count of Benavente, Andrea would provide the Habsburgs with information 
about Algiers which he received through his connections. Moreover, Francesco 
would go to Algiers to join his brother and negotiate with Uluc Ali his defection 
to the Habsburg side. According to Francesco, the promise of a good income and 
an inheritable title, muy buena renta con algun titulo para si y sus descendientes, 
would persuade this former Habsburg vassal to change sides37.
I should add here that Habsburg spies reported in 1569 that the janissaries 
of the city had sent a messenger to Istanbul, asking for the dispatch of former 
governor-general Hasan Pasha, the son of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha38. This news 
made Philip II conclude that Uluc Ali’s precarious situation in his post would 
render him more susceptible to the idea of defection. There were also incentives 
for the Habsburg side to open negotiations as soon as possible: a deal with a 
powerful corsair and the governor-general of Algeria would be an invaluable 
 33. GARNICER, C. and MARCoS, J.: Espías de Felipe II: Los servicios secretos del Imperio español. 
Madrid, 2005, p. 94.
 34. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, document entitled «el despacho que estava hecho para que llevasse 
el hombre que avia de yr a Argel».  
 35. SolA, E.: Uchalí, pp. 147-151, 159-164.
 36. They were active in valencia, Algiers, Barcelona and Marseille. They not only ran a trade 
agency between these port cities but also coordinated diplomacy and trade between northern Medi-
terranean and North Africa by engaging in information gathering, the translation of documents, the 
ransoming of Christian slaves and the negotiation of commercial agreements between Europe and 
North Africa. GARCÉS, M. A.: Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive’s Tale. Nashville, 2002, pp. 89-90. 
 37. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, documents dated 22 october 1568, 9 January 1569 and 22 January 
1569.
 38. AGS, Estado, leg. 487 document dated 30 January 1569. 
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asset especially at such a critical juncture when the Revolt of Alpujarras erupted 
in Granada and rumors of a possible Morisco-ottoman alliance intensified39.
Having agreed with the viceroy of Naples on basic principles, Francesco went 
to Madrid to work out the details of the plan. The Gasparo Corso brothers would 
first contact Uluc Ali’s steward (kahya) Memi Corso (a relative of the Gasparo 
Corso brothers), a galley captain named Catania Reis and the Moroccan prince in 
exile, Abdu’l-Melik (later Abdu’l-Melik I of Morocco, r. 1576-1578). Even though 
the latter’s financial remunerations were left out, details regarding the offers to be 
made to Uluc Ali, Memi Corso and Catania were recorded in a document dated 2 
July 1569: Uluç Ali was offered 10,000 ducats de renta in the kingdom of Naples 
that he could pass to his descendants as well as the title of count, marquis or duke. 
Catania would receive 4,000 ducats de renta in the kingdom of Sicily with the title 
of baron or count and Memi would get 3,000 ducats de renta in either one of the 
two kingdoms with the title of baron or count.  All were allowed to bring their 
properties and families with them. Andrea and Francesco themselves would get 
2,000 ducats. This unusually high amount for go-betweens and spies operating in 
the Mediterranean borderlands40 should be read as a testament to the anxiousness 
of the Habsburgs to ensure Uluc’s defection. Finally, the Gasparo Corso brothers 
were authorized to make financial offers to other potential defectors (could one 
of these be Abdu’l-Melik whose financial remuneration was not mentioned in 
the documentation?) in accordance with their «quality»41. In case Uluc refused 
the offer, they were also allowed to raise the value of Memi and Catania’s fief to 
6,000 ducats with the inheritable title of count or marquis, provided that they 
could submit Algiers on their own42.
The kind of arguments that the authorities believed Andrea should use in 
order to convince Uluc Ali are clear proof that the Habsburgs wanted to employ 
psychological as well as material factors and that they believed that Uluc Ali’s 
Christian background was an asset they should make use of43. Andrea would 
remind the Calabrian corsair of his Christian past and add that he should leave 
this life he conducted «against reason, natural law and the God’s truth» and return 
 39. HESS, A. H.: «The Moriscos: An ottoman Fifth Column is the Sixteenth-Century Spain», 
American Historical Review, lXXIv, october 1968, pp. 1-25.
 40. Based on the payments that the Habsburgs authorized to spies operating in the ottoman 
Empire, my conclusion is that they received amounts changing between 100-400 ducats. GÜRKAN, 
Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean go-betweens and the 
Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry. Ph.D. Diss., Georgetown University, 2012, p. 156. Numbers mentioned 
by Garnicer and Marcos (Espías de Felipe II, p. 291) are higher: 300-500 ducats. 
 41. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, documents dated 2 July 1569, 28 July 1569 («Instruction primera a 
Andrea y Francesco Gasparo sobre el negocio de Argel»).
 42. AGS, Estado 487, document dated 17 July 1569. 
 43. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, document dated 2 July 1569.
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to him (deve tener aborrescido camino tan contra la razon y ley natural y contra 
la verdad de dios como por el que ha bivido hasta agora y que deve de desear en 
su animo y coraçon grandemente bolverse a el). Moreover, Andrea would point 
out that neither his life nor his property would be safe as long as he stayed in 
Algiers. If he returned to Catholicism and submitted Algiers, on the other hand, 
he would be granted aristocratic titles and fiefs. In short, he could be his own 
master and honor his family name (sera senor para sy y para su posteridad con tanta 
honra y gloria como la que le esta agardando desta obra para illustrar su nombre 
y casa y el de todos los suyos perpetuamente). Here Andrea would be referring to 
the fact that it was common in the ottoman Empire for high-level officials to be 
executed and their possessions confiscated44. For a parvenu outsider such as Uluc 
Ali who made his fortune quickly in a frontier region and who lacked necessary 
connections in the ottoman capital, losing favor could easily result in losing his 
life and possessions. At a time when rumors of his dismissal from his post were 
circulating everywhere, such an argument would have seemed quite compelling. 
Moreover, arguments that Andrea would make reflect the common stereotype 
of the time: greedy Turks, the despotic ottoman Sultan and an empire of slaves 
where nobody’s life and possessions were secure45.
Francesco never made the trip to Algiers. In his stead, a third brother, Felipe, 
arrived in the corsair den. Before there was an agreement, however, Uluc left 
Algiers in order to take advantage of the Habsburgs’ occupation with the Revolt 
of Alpujarras. With a swift military expedition, he conquered Tunis in 1569. 
During his absence in Algiers, a new idea came to the fore: Could Memi, Uluc Ali’s 
lieutenant in the city, submit this strategic port to the Habsburgs?46. According 
to Andrea, this was not possible given that Algerian janissaries who were already 
not very fond of Uluc Ali kept his renegade lieutenant under close surveillance. 
When Uluc returned from Tunis, he was no more cooperative than before. He 
 44. on the ottoman practice of confiscation, müsadere, see. BoSWoRTH, C. E.: «Musâdara», 
Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. vII, p. 652. Rörhborn, K.: «Konfiskation und intermediäre 
Gewalten im osmanischen Reich», Der Islam, 55, 1978, pp. 345-51. FoDoR, P.: Vállalkozásra 
kényszerítve: az oszmán pénzügyigazgatás és hatalmi elit változásai a 16 - 17. század fordulóján. 
Budapest, 2006, pp. 125-144. BARBIR, K. K.: «one Marker of ottomanism: Confiscation of ottoman 
officials’ Estates», Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World, eds. Baki Tezcan and 
Karl Barbir, a special issue of International Journal of Turkish Studies, 13/1-2, 2007: pp. 1-6.
 45. For Turkish image in early modern Europe, see. SCHWoEBEl, R.: The Shadow of the Cres-
cent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517). New York, 1967. vAlENSI, l.: The Birth of 
the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte. Ithaca, 1993. SoYKUT, M.: Image of the «Turk» in Italy: 
a History of the «Other» in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683. Berlin, 2001. Ricci, G.: Ossessione 
Turca: in una retrovia Cristiana dell’Europa moderna. Bologna, 2002. KUMRUlAR, Ö. (ed.): Dünya’da 
Türk İmgesi. İstanbul, 2005.
 46. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, documents dated 30 November 1569 and 14 December 1569. 
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refused to negotiate with Andrea, even though Memi Kahya was still willing47. A 
few months later Uluc left North Africa with his corsair fleet to join the ottoman 
fleet for the Battle of lepanto. Memi was once again left behind. When rumors 
of his negotiations with Andrea started to circulate, however, tensions between 
him and the Algerian janissaries arose even further. The latter obliged Memi to 
reside in Uluc’s palace under the watchful eyes of forty of their comrades48. In 
the meantime, the Marquis of Pescara, the viceroy of Sicily, dispatched a certain 
Jaime losada, one of Uluc’s several former slaves, in order to continue negotia-
tions. He could not produce any results49.
Meanwhile, Uluc Ali survived the disaster at lepanto with the left wing of 
the ottoman navy intact and his success in extricating his ships and salvaging a 
part of the ottoman fleet brought him the grand-admiralty. This meant that he 
left the scene of Algerian politics. Still, Habsburg spies continued their activities 
in North Africa, in the aftermath lepanto when rumors arose in Algiers that the 
victorious allied fleet would besiege the city. In 1573, Don Juan sent to Spain an 
Italian soldier named Renzo who offered to the Habsburg authorities to arrange the 
submission of Algiers with the help of his brother Kaid Hasan. He was dispatched 
to Algiers accompanied by Andrés Fernández de Truvia, a Spanish soldier. They 
were authorized to offer Renzo’s brother 12.000 ducats and an aristocratic title. 
Their mission failed when Don Juan attacked Tunis rather than Algiers. Similarly, 
there were negotiations with Uluc Ali’s successor, Arab Ahmed, from two different 
channels: one via a merchant named Juan Pexon and a Murcian cleric, Francisco 
Núñez and the other via the Gasparo Corso brothers50. 
leaving these negotiations in Algiers aside, let us follow Uluc Ali to Istanbul. 
First of all, his promotion to the grand admiralty made him even more important 
in the eyes of the Habsburgs decision-makers. Financial problems as well as the 
revolt in the low Countries made the Habsburgs growingly reluctant to invest 
in a conflict with the ottomans in the Mediterranean. Their primary ally, venice, 
signed a separate peace agreement behind their back in 1574. Furthermore, in spite 
of the fact that most of their fleet was annihilated in lepanto (they lost more than 
200 ships), the ottomans quickly rebuilt their fleet and conquered Tunis and la 
Goletta in 1574. Finally, while naval costs and defense expenditures continuously 
increased, Madrid had to declare bankruptcy in 1575. Under these circumstances, 
something had to be done about the ottoman navy which was strengthened by 
the manpower and expertise of Uluc Ali and his corsairs.
 47. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, document dated 6 April 1570. 
 48. AGS, Estado, leg. 487, document dated 14 June 1570, full text in SolA, E.: Uchalí, pp. 165-172.
 49. AGS, Estado, leg. 1072, fol. 14 (15 December 1575).
 50. For details of these negotiations, see. SolA, E.: Uchalí, pp. 208-210.
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Far-away Istanbul was out of reach for Madrid; it was simply impossible to 
operate with spies and agents sent from the center. Provincial authorities had to 
step in. The first to take the initiative was the commander of the allied fleet, Don 
Juan de Austria, who dispatched from Messina to Istanbul a renegade named 
Paulo de Arcuri as early as December 1571, only three months after the Battle of 
lepanto. Knowing Uluc Ali in person, Paulo would try to ensure the cunning 
corsair’s defection in the aftermath of a disastrous naval defeat. He was ordered to 
remind Uluc Ali of his Christian past and let him know that Philip II was willing 
to bestow upon him exceptional honors should he return home. Uluc was expected 
to submit either Algiers or Tripolis, or revolt with a number of ottoman ships 
and switch sides, or surrender a strategic place to Don Juan’s navy. one should 
not forget, however, that Paulo’s mission also included information gathering; 
he was to send regular reports regarding the ottoman navy. We do not know 
whether he managed to find Uluc Ali51. The silence of documentation suggests 
his mission failed to produce serious results.
once Uluc Ali returned to the ottoman capital with his fleet, the Habsburg 
secret service had to find another medium to negotiate with him. Fortunately, 
following the defeat of Djerba they had already established an operative intelligence 
network in Istanbul, composed of merchants, ransom agents, go-betweens as well 
as renegades in key positions within the ottoman administrative and military 
apparatus52. These resident agents on payroll sent regular information regarding 
the naval preparations in the ottoman Arsenal, the possible destination of the 
ottoman navy and the political situation in Istanbul. They also proposed several 
covert operations of sabotage, assassination and bribery in order to debilitate the 
ottoman naval capability53. To achieve their ends, it was only natural that these 
go-betweens quickly established connections within Uluc Ali’s household and 
faction, mostly composed of renegades. Two of them, for instance, Sinan (Juan 
de Briones) and Haydar (Robert Drever), agreed to provide information54. They 
 51. AGS, Estado, leg. 1134, fols. 198 and 199 (20 December 1571). 
 52. For their activities, see. SolA, E.: Los que van y vienen: Información y fronteras en el Medi-
terráneo clasico del siglo XVI. Alcalá de Henares, 2005, pp. 199-248 and GÜRKAN, E. S.: Espionage in 
the 16th century Mediterranean, Chapter Five.
 53. on their sabotage operations in Istanbul, see. GÜRKAN, E. S.: «Fitilin ucunda Tersane-yi 
Amire», Osmanlı İstanbulu I: I. Uluslararası Osmanlı İstanbulu Sempozyumu Bildirileri , 29 Mayıs 
– 1 Haziran 2013, İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi, eds. Feridun Emecen and Emrah Safa Gürkan. 
İstanbul, 2014, pp. 43-70.
 54. AGS, Estado, leg. 1080, fol. 33 (3 and 18 June 1579). 
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wrote several letters55, some of which were sent aboard ottoman galleys56 and 
thus included the most fresh news regarding ottoman naval plans. 
After a series of attempts to entice Uluc into changing sides failed, the 
Habsburgs started to look for other ways. If he could not be corrupted, he could 
perhaps be assassinated. Assassination was a frequently employed method in 
sixteenth-century politics. Monarchs such as Henri III, Henri Iv and Jeanne 
d’Albret, aristocrats such as William of orange, ministers such as Sokollu Mehmed 
Pasha and several other important figures, soldiers, diplomats, courtiers, etc. 
all met their demise at the hand of an assassin. Blade and poison were the most 
common tools; yet, there were more complicated methods as well. Catherine de’ 
Medici, for instance, killed Jeanne d’Albret with a pair of perfumed gloves. It was 
reported that Prince Mehmed tried to kill his father by sending him a mechanical 
box that fired a bullet when opened. Fortunately, the cautious Sultan had one of 
his mutes open the box57. A similar attempt would be proposed by Pietro lanza, 
a skilled corsair in Habsburg employ in 160858. The ottomans seemed aware of 
the fact that the sultans were natural targets for assassins. Strangers, even ambas-
sadors, were not allowed to approach the Sultan without gatekeepers securing 
their arms on both sides. 
Poison seemed to be the most popular method of assassination in the ottoman 
capital. Rumors abound around the death of important political figures. It was 
suspected, for instance, that Bayezid II was poisoned by his son Selim59. Simi-
larly, when Ferhad Pasha passed away, his men claimed that his physician had 
 55. AGS, Estado, leg. 490, documents dated 17, 18 and 22 october 1579; full text in Sola, E.: 
«Un Ferrarés en Estambul, Regef Bei Uglan o Recep oglan Bei», Archivo de la Frontera, <http://
www.archivodelafrontera.com/pdf/A-MED24.pdf>.
 56. AGS, Estado, leg. 1080, fols. 41 (14 May 1579), 51, 58 (3 August 1579) and 93 (7 June 1580).
 57. lUBENAU, R.: Beschreibung der Reisen de Reinhold Lubenau, ed. W. Sahm. Königsberg, 
1930, vol. II, p. 169.
 58. According to this plan, the seventy-five year old corsair-cum-spy lanza would go to 
Constantinople and give the Sultan a present, a wooden round-shaped box with two compartments. 
In the one above, he would put something odorant such as musk, amber, zibet or an odorant soap 
(cose odorifere cioé muschio o ambre o zibetto ovveramente sapone odorifero). In the one below, he 
would place gunpowder that would explode when the fuse ran out. Needless to say, the odorant 
material to be placed in the above compartment would make sure no one smell the gunpowder or 
the fuse. He also offered other covert operations: to torch the ottoman Arsenal with Greek fire in 
such a way that the blame would fall on the venetians (lanza’s nemeses). Moreover, he would enter 
the two castles on either side of the Bosphorus, Rumeli and Anadolu Hisarları and explode their 
ammunition depots (intrate in li 2 castelli di Constantinopoli et brusiargli le monicioni de la polvere). 
ASv, Capi del Consiglio dei Dieci, Lettere di Ambasciatori, b. 19, fol. 81 (16 December 1608).
 59. For a comprehensive survey of contemporary sources that recorded these widespread 
rumours, see. EMECEN, F. M.: Zamanın İskenderi, Şarkın Fatihi: Yavuz Sultan Selim. İstanbul, 2010, 
pp. 67-70.
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killed him by administering a wrong medicine (mesirditos)60. When Özdemiroğlu 
osman Pasha died in the Persian front, his corpse was brought to Istanbul and 
an autopsy was performed in order to decide whether he was poisoned or not61.
At the top of the ottoman naval establishment, it was natural that Uluc Ali was 
a prime target for assassins. The first recorded attempt on his life, however, was 
made not by assassins employed by another state, but by his own men. According 
to a letter dated March 1574 and written by Habsburg agents in Istanbul, three of 
Uluc’s renegades conspired with Christian galley slaves against their master. Their 
plan was to kill the Calabrian at night and then escape with his brigantine to their 
fatherland.  It was common that renegades, longing for their home, repented their 
conversion and attempted to run away. Even if their motive is understandable, 
there are certain incongruities in their plot. What they tried to achieve by killing 
Uluc Ali is not clear. They could run away without killing him; there should have 
been several other brigantines to steal. Moreover, it would be wiser for these fugi-
tives not to draw the attention of the entire empire by assassinating an ottoman 
grandee. In short, killing the Grand Admiral and disappearing with his brigantine 
was a terrible idea. So why do it? Were they commissioned by an unnamed state 
to kill the ottoman Grand Admiral? It is obvious that the Habsburgs were not 
involved, but this is totally possible; Uluc Ali had no shortage of enemies. Again, 
another possibility was that there were tensions within the ottoman establishment 
or more specifically within Uluc Ali’s household that pitted the culprits against 
the Calabrian corsairs. 
It is hard to say which of the above theories is valid, or if any of them is valid at 
all. What we know for sure, however, is that the conspiracy was discovered and the 
culprits met a terrible end: their noses were cut and they were killed with all sorts of 
(diverse sorti) tortures62. Another witness to this conspiracy was Stephan Gerlach, 
the chaplain of the Austrian ambassador whose memoires have survived. He related 
that some of Uluc Ali’s slaves were caught just before they assassinated the corsair; 
they had dug below his bedroom in order to place explosives. They were only two 
bricks away when they were apprehended because a Spanish conspirator betrayed 
them to the authorities. According to the chaplain, some were impaled while others 
were beaten to death. Ironically, the Spanish was among the executed on account of 
the fact that he participated in the early stages of the plot63. The fact that Gerlach 
 60. The physician, Şeyh Şucâ, was tried in the ottoman imperial council with court physicians 
and the leading ‘ulama present. He was found guilty and imprisoned even though the author who 
related the story believed that his treatment of the patient was the right one. SElÂNIKÎ: Tarih-i Selâ-
nikî, ed. Mehmet İpşirli. Ankara, 1999, vol. I, p. 111.
 61. ASv, SDC, fil. 22, c. 393r (8 January 1585, more veneto).
 62. AGS, Estado, leg. 1064, fol. 136 (17 March 1574).
 63. GERlACH, S.: Tagebuch. Frankfurt am Main, 1674, p. 46.
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said nothing of a desired escape to Christianity strengthens our suspicion that they 
may have been hired by enemy secret services. A word of caution: the presence of a 
Spanish renegade in the plot should not mislead us into thinking that the Habsburgs 
were behind the conspiracy. Uluc Ali had several Spanish renegades and slaves, and 
in turn, the Habsburg secret service did not exclusively hire the Spanish.
It is not very likely that the Habsburg secret service played an active role in 
this plot. When a year later another attempt was made on Uluc Ali’s life, however, 
it would be planned and funded directly by the Habsburg authorities. Francisco 
Peloso was one of several agents that the viceroy of Sicily sent to Istanbul to 
gather information. When he returned from the ottoman capital without bringing 
substantial information in 1575, he quickly came up with an interesting offer, 
most probably in order to prove his use to his employer. He offered to poison the 
Grand Admiral and other important captains in the ottoman navy, something he 
claimed he could do easily as he was welcome in their houses. Moreover, he could 
explode the ammunition depot (magazen de las municiones) which, he argued, 
was an easier target than the Arsenal, the primary target of several Habsburg 
saboteurs in the past. Even though the viceroy of Sicily, the Duke of Terranova, 
did not categorically refuse the offer, he was cautious: «I know very well the 
difference between the word and the deed», between palabra and exequición, 
he stated64. The viceroy quickly provided the Greek fire (fuegos artificales) that 
was necessary for Peloso’s sabotage operation. It proved impossible, neverthe-
less, to find poison (veneno artificial) in Sicily. This means that the prospects of 
a successful assassination already looked thin from the outset65. leaving his son 
to the viceroy’s care66, an undeterred Peloso returned to the levant, and there is 
no further mention in the documents about his mission67. 
In 1573, Don Juan sent to Istanbul two go-betweens named Antonio Avellán 
and virgilio Polidoro. Their mission was to accompany the ransomed ottoman 
slaves, among whom the son of the ottoman Grand Admiral at lepanto, Müezzin-
zade Ali Pasha. According to the French ambassador, François Noailles, Bishop of 
Dax, the duo also tested the waters for a five-year truce68. Even though negotiations 
 64. AGS, Estado, leg. 1144, fol. 96 (9 August 1575).
 65. Idem, fol. 122 (21 october 1575).
 66. He received assurances from the viceroy that if some disgrace befell him in this dangerous 
mission, he would treat his son in such a way that it was «just» and worthy of his father’s service.
 67. For Peloso’s letters from Chios: AGS, Estado, leg. 1145, fols. 54 (9 February 1576) and 60. 
Also see. E 1144, fols. 113-4 (29 September 1575).
 68. CHARRIÈRE, E. (ed.): Négociations de la France dans le Levant, ou, Correspondances, mémoires 
et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople et des ambassadeurs, envoyés 
ou résidents à divers titres à Venise, Raguse, Rome, Malte et Jérusalem, en Turquie, Perse, Géorgie, 
Crimée, Syrie, Egypte, etc., et dans les états de Tunis, d’Alger et de Maroc. Paris, 1848-60, vol. III, 
pp. 416-424.
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for a truce did not go through, the duo returned to Istanbul two years later to 
negotiate the ransom of Christian soldiers that had fallen captive in la Goletta. 
They received a safe-conduct from Sokollu with the condition that they returned 
with more ottoman captives to be exchanged with Christians. During their stay 
in Istanbul, they got in touch with Aurelio Santa Croce, the Habsburg spymas-
ter in the city, Hürrem Bey, a renegade from lucca and the imperial dragoman 
(interpreter of the Imperial Council, Divan-ı Hümayun tercümanı) on Habsburg 
payroll, and two new potential Habsburg informants: Murad Ağa, the lucan 
mayordomo (kahya) of Uluc Ali whom Habsburg agents Alferez Francisco de 
orejon and Matheo Pozo had contacted in 1567, and lorenzo Saminiate, the 
resident of lucca in Constantinople and a relative of a Habsburg official. 
The duo was also carrying letters of encouragement from Philip II addressed 
to Aurelio, Hürrem and Murad Ağa. The Prudent King congratulated their deci-
sion to «reduce themselves to their holy Catholic faith» and asked Murad Ağa to 
persuade Uluc Ali to follow the same path as well69. The fact that Philip II, who 
generally shunned addressing his agents and informants directly, wrote a letter 
to Murad Ağa is a clear proof of the importance attributed to secret operations 
targeting Uluc Ali, his household and the corsair establishment in the ottoman 
capital. Avellán established other contacts among Uluc’s men and recruited five 
other renegades who, he believed, could help him convince Uluc to change his 
allegiance: Süleyman Ağa from lombardy, a.k.a. Antonio de vale, the English 
Comorat (Murad?) Ağa, a.k.a. Carlo Daniel, two French Maltese knights (dos 
franceses del hábito de San Juan) and a Spaniard, the son of the commander of the 
la Goletta fortress (capitán de Goleta)70. An interesting side story is that virgilio 
Polidoro made a fatal mistake and lost Philip II’s letter which fell into the ottoman 
hands. The conspiracy was almost compromised if not for Antonio Avellán’s 
ability to think on his feet. He was shocked when the son of an ottoman pasha, 
a prisoner-of-war whom he ransomed and brought to Constantinople (he should 
be the afore-mentioned son of Müezzinzade Ali Pasha), gave him the letter so 
that he could cryptanalyze it. Realizing the danger, Avellán quickly lied about its 
contents and destroyed the letter.
The same year, in March 1575, the viceroy of Sicily dispatched Jaime losada 
to Istanbul. Under the pretext of negotiating the exchange of slaves with the 
 69. Avellán’s first letter, AGS, Estado, leg. 1144, fol. 281 (6 June 1575). For Philip II’s letters, 
fols. 283-5. Full text online in SolA, E.: «Antón Avellán, un eficaz agente español en estambul al 
descubierto», Archivo de la Frontera, <http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/pdf/A-MED03-avellan.
pdf>. 
 70. AGS, Estado, leg. 488, Antón Avellán, Constantinopla, 1576 and the two letters written by 
two of these renegades. SolA, E.: «Moriscos, Renegados y Agentes Secretos Españoles en la Época 
de Cervantes», Otam, 4, 1993, pp. 350. 
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ottomans, he would conduct a secret mission: to contact his former master Uluc 
Ali and negotiate his defection. losada was Uluc’s grande amico, according to the 
venetian bailo, and the Calabrian corsair welcomed him very warmly, arranging a 
house for him to stay in Galata and gladly accepting his presents (diversas suertes 
de confituras y quesos y otras cosas). Previously, he had taken part in the talks 
between Uluc Ali and the Gasparo Corso brothers in Tunis in 1569. However, 
in spite of all the courtesy with which he treated his former slave, Uluc was not 
responsive to his offers. He stated that «the Grand Señor gave him everything he 
wanted and he [losada] should give up making such offers». Even though he did 
not relate the entire conversation in his long report (he promised to do it orally, 
a boca), losada was disillusioned enough to state that these negotiations were a 
waste of time71. Was it a coincidence that losada started the conversation in which 
the issue of defection came to the fore by mentioning the negotiations that had 
taken place in Tunis in 1569? or was it a calculated attempt that demonstrates 
that his instructions included not only the Grand Admiral’s defection but also 
the submission of one of the corsair ports in North Africa? If this were the case, 
this port would most likely be the recently conquered Tunis where the ottoman 
power was weak and where Uluc Ali left his loyal lieutenant Ramazan Pasha. 
Unfortunately, given that the instructions he was supposed to have received from 
the viceroy of Sicily have not survived, we can only speculate. 
The ottomans and the Habsburgs finally came to a mutual agreement when 
they signed a truce in February 1581 after forty months of negotiations. The nego-
tiator of this truce and the unofficial Habsburg ambassador Giovanni Margliani 
plotted another possible attempt on Uluc’s life. Given that Uluc was the most 
ardent opponent of truce negotiations, Margliani should have thought it wise to 
eliminate such a threat. He wrote to the viceroy of Naples Comendador Mayor 
Juan de Zúñiga y Requesens that two of his informants among Uluc Ali’s men, the 
aforementioned Sinan and Haydar, offered to assassinate their master. It is worth 
 71. Even though he refused the offer, Uluc made use of losada. He secured him an audience 
with the ottoman Grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha with the hope of acquiring information from 
him. The Grand vizier initially asked losada to intervene in securing the restitution of a ship whose 
crew rebelled and took refuge in Malta. The conversation took a different turn, however, when the 
issue came to the possibility of a truce, an opportunity of which both the Grand vizier and Jaime 
were quick to realize the importance. The Grand vizier told him that if Philip II sent Istanbul a 
diplomat, he would be welcome and well-treated. losada showed an impressive acumen and aptness 
in diplomacy, arguing against a possible tribute and refusing to say something binding. Moreover, he 
quickly socialized within the diplomatic circles of the ottoman capital by befriending the venetian, 
French and Austrian ambassadors. Even though he soon set sail in order to communicate the message 
to the Habsburg authorities, he died in otranto before completing his mission and left behind a 
detailed report. It was one of his men who went to Naples and informed the viceroy. AGS, Estado, 
leg. 1072, fol. 14 (15 December 1575), reprinted in SolA, E.:, Uchalí, pp. 220-231; ASv, SDC, fil. 11, 
fol. 12 (23 March 1577). 
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noting that the viceroy of Naples considered killing Uluc Ali morally unpro-
blematic. He could be assassinated with «good conscience» (buena conciencia), 
because he was Philip II’s vassal and a renegade. Nevertheless, the same viceroy 
opposed Margliani’s offer to have Sinan and Haydar assassinate Bartolomeo Brutti, 
an Albanese go-between who was tampering with truce negotiations in Istanbul. 
Brutti could not be assassinated with «good conscience» because he was neither 
his majesty’s vassal nor a renegade. Thus Uluc’s betrayal to his monarch as well 
as his abandonment of the true religion meant that he deserved to be killed. our 
aim here is not to enter into a theological or a legal debate, but I believe that this 
example, one of few instances where Habsburg authorities revealed their percep-
tion of renegade turncoats like Uluc Ali, is quite enlightening72.
The ottoman-Habsburg truce was signed between Sokollu Mehmed Pasha 
and Giovanni Margliani in 158173. It was renewed in 1584 and there were talks 
of another renewal in 1587, the year of Uluc Ali’s death. The Calabrian corsair 
appeared in the Western Mediterranean for the last time in 1581 for an expedition 
that never reached its principal target, Morocco. Although he continued to play an 
important role in ottoman politics, he was of no more concern to the Habsburgs 
and thus not a target for Habsburg spies anymore. Engaged in a lengthy and costly 
war in the eastern front, the ottomans could not invest in naval operations in the 
Western Mediterranean. In spite of his pleas for action and political machinations 
to make sure that the ottomans pursued a bellicose Mediterranean policy, Uluc Ali 
had to be content with sweet words and unprofitable assignments such as carrying 
provisions and victuals in the Black Sea for the ottoman army fighting in the East. 
3. Conclusion
This article is as much about go-betweens who operated in Mediterranean 
borderlands as Uluc Ali himself. These entrepreneurial agents of espionage capi-
talized on their trans-imperial life trajectories while brokering between capitals. 
Mastering the cultural codes of both empires, they weaved dense networks of 
patronage across civilizations, networks which they relied on when they offered 
central governments their services as information traders, saboteurs, negotiators, 
assassins and even unofficial diplomatic intermediaries. 
 72. AGS, Estado, leg. 1081, fols. 61 (24 March 1580) and 94 (31 March 1580).
 73. For details of the truce negotiations, see. BRAUDEl, La Méditerranée, vol. II, pp. 439-450. 
SKIllITER, S. A.: «The Hispano-ottoman Armistice of 1581», Iran and Islam: in memory of the late 
Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C. E. Bosworth. Edinburgh, 1971, pp. 491-515. RoDRÍGUEZ SAlGADo, M. 
J.: Felipe II, el «Paladín de la Cristiandad y la paz con el Turco». valladolid, 2004, pp. 51-181. Sola, 
E.: los que van y vienen, pp. 224-248. GÜRKAN, E. S.: Espionage in the 16th century Mediterranean, 
pp. 291-302.
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I have sought here to shed light on the conduits through which covert 
operations were undertaken by central governments and their agents dispersed 
throughout the Mediterranean. The power of information gathering mechanisms 
and the efficiency of epistolary networks illustrate how easy it was to transcend 
the seemingly stark boundaries which historians once hastily erected between 
monolithic civilizational/religious/cultural blocks. Islam and Christianity were 
simply not self-contained binaries dividing the Mare Nostrum into two hostile 
camps. By concentrating on a comprehensive series of negotiations between 
Habsburg authorities and the key figure of the ottoman naval establishment, I 
have also tried to emphasize the possibility of cross-confessional diplomacy in 
the early modern Mediterranean. 
It is also necessary to illuminate a rather less obvious part of this diplomacy. 
Imperial rivalries did not necessarily play out in the form of open warfare or by 
means of guns and cannons. In order to eliminate the ottoman naval threat, the 
Habsburgs resorted to a number of methods, ranging from open diplomacy to 
secret warfare, i.e. clandestine measures such as sabotage, bribery and assassination. 
Whether these produced results or not is irrelevant; the point is that they were 
deemed worthy of money, manpower and attention. In either case, the amounts 
dispersed to these agents in whatever operation that seemed implausible to the 
modern reader were much more modest compared to those employed in military 
measures. While our agents received some hundred ducats per annum, Uluc was 
offered amounts changing between ten and twelve thousand ducats. These were 
not small amounts; but they surely were no match to millions of ducats invested 
in large fleets and coastal defenses. Though small their success rate may have been, 
the continued conduct of clandestine activities was surely an affordable gamble.
This study has also highlighted a security issue that the employment of rene-
gades imposed upon the ottomans. Incorporating these go-betweens into the 
empire was a double-edged sword. Their connections on the other side of the 
frontier brought substantial benefits in terms of diplomacy, warfare, information 
gathering, technology, and trade. Yet, on the other hand, this practice opened the 
empire to outside influences and brought the possibility of information leakage 
(as was the case with Uluc Ali’s men Haydar and Sinan, but also several others) 
as well as defection. This threat should be an obvious one for the ottomans. 
Some of the renegades were for a good reason extremely careful not to contact 
their compatriots publicly or seem supportive of their former monarchs in the 
ottoman capital74. 
 74. For instance, Gazanfer Ağa always preferred to keep his distance from his venetian compa-
triots. PEDANI, M. P.: «veneziani a Costantinopoli alla fine del XvI secolo», Quaderni di Studi Arabi, 
15, 1997, pp. 70, fn. 8.
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An interesting detail is that no matter how firmly Uluc Ali refused Habsburg 
offers of defection, he never denounced a Habsburg agent or had one arrested. 
on the contrary, he treated them exceptionally well. It could justly be argued 
that Uluc was trying to make use of these go-betweens who would have the 
most updated information regarding the enemy’s naval preparations and who 
had connections with the Habsburg authorities that could have been used for 
diplomatic purposes (please keep in mind that there was no open diplomatic chan-
nels and diplomacy between Istanbul and Madrid was conducted through these 
trans-imperial intermediaries)75. Nonetheless, it is fair to assume that Uluc tried 
to keep such channels of communication open in case things took a different turn 
in the ottoman capital. It should not be for nothing that Habsburg agents tried 
to capitalize on the Calabrian renegade’s fear of losing his life and/or property. 
Such fears were not irrational; many stronger men than Uluc Ali lost everything 
along the ottoman corridors of power. 
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